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ROGER BROOKE TANEY.*
It is a remarkable fact that diiring the one hundred and
eleven years since the adoption of the Constitution, the Supreme Court of the United States has been presided over by
but seven men: John Jay, John Routledge, Oliver Ellsworth,
John Marshall, Roger Brooke Taney, Salmon P. Chase, Morrison R. Waite and Melville W. Fuller.
All of these were men of force, of learning, and exalted
virtue, but the fame of some of them was won elsewhere than
in the law.
-Jay, Ellsworth, Routledge were among the founders of the
Republic. Chase's reputation is based as much, perhaps, upon
his consummate knowledge of finance and his ability in managing the Treasury during our great Civil War, as upon his
decisions as a judge.
Of Waite it may be sufficient to say that he held the scales
of justice with an even and a steady hand and won the entire
respect of his fellow-citizens and of the profession which he
adorned, during his entire term.
*A paper read before the Law School of Dickinson College, March
IO, 1899.
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The record of Chief Justice Fuller is not made up, but it
may be well believed that he will worthily maintain the traditions of his office. The two men whose fame rests exclusively upon their performance of duty as Chief Justice of the
United States, whose names come spontaneously to the mind
whenever that great tribunal is mentioned, are Marshall and
Taney. Marshall had been a soldier of the Revolutionary
War, a: distinguished member of Congress and a diplomatist
before he was appointed to the Chief Justiceship by President
Washington, whose historian he was. As Lord Mansfield
may be gaid to have been the father of modern commercial
law, as the names of Erskine and Scarlett will always be associated with the particular combination of learning and practical knowledge of human nature joined to the art of expres.sion, which constitutes what is known as the jury lawyer, as
the name of Lord Selborne will go down to history as the
man who moulded that great measure of legal reform, the
Judicature Act in England, so the name of Marshall will be
forever known as the creator of constitutional law in the
United States.
All written constitutions are codes; and because of the
infirmity of human language, it is not possible to formulate
any code in the interpretation of which controversies may not
arise.
To you, as students of law, this is a trueism; and the
familiar example of the Statute of Frauds, every line of which
is said to have cost a subsidy to interpret, is cited to point the
moral. It could not be expected that the Constitution of the
United States would be free fr6m obscurity, lucid as the language is; it could not be expected that the minds of those
who formed it could have foreseen every case to which it was
likely to be applied, precient as their minds were; and so it
came to pass that, when in 1789 -the discordant governments
of the different states of the confederacy became a nation, and
as years passed the young Republic grew, questions continually
arose requiring an interpretation of the Constitution, and the
Supreme Court was the only tribunal whose judgment upon
them was final.
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Under the masterful leadership of Marshall, who penned
many of its decisions and who gave tone to the entire court,
a body of constitutional law had been formed before his death
in 1835, the importance of which it is impossible to measure.
Its far-reaching effects were to consolidate the Republic, to
give to the central government those attributes of sovereignty,
without which it would have been impossible for it to exist,
and to create a class of constitutional thinkers whose influence
will be felt so long as the nation endures.
It is of Marshall's great successor, Chief Justice Taney, I
intend to speak to you. I have been led to think that the
story of his career would be of special interest because he was
a graduate, and so far as an exalted position could make him,
the greatest graduate of this ancient college. It will be for
you to decide, when you have measured his character by his
works, whether it cannot be said of him also that he was in
morals equally as great as in intellect.
I approach the consideration of Chief Justice Taney's career
with some hesitation, first, because I am in no way sure that I
cast any additional light upon it, or illustrate it by facts that
have not been already made known. His life has been written
by his friend Samuel Tyler. His decisions have been carefully reviewed by that eminent lawyer, George W. Biddle, of
the Philadelphia Bar, whose well-rounded career was recently
closed, and an eloquent and able paper was read before the
American Bar Association by Clarkson N. Potter of New
York at the Session of 1882, which did full justice to his
character and attainments. Besides this literature, we have
Flanders and Van Santvoord's lives, and the brief, but able
sketch in Hampton L. Carson's History of the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Notwithstanding the fact that in his early manhood and in
his old age, Taney's name was the very storm centre of heated
controversy; and notwithstanding all that has been written of
him, I doubt whether sufficient interest has been felt in these
recent years to study his career, and my belief in its importance, by reason of his attitude on great constitutional questions, one of which required a bloody war for its final settle-
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ment, together with the appropriateness, as it seemed to me,
of this subject in an address before the Law School of Dickinson College, must be my excuse, if any be needed, for the
selection I have made.
On the I7th of March, 1777, in Calvert County in the State
of Maryland, Taney was born, the son of Michael of that
name, a land-owner on the Patuxent River. His. forefathers
were among the early emigrants to Maryland. They were
Roman Catholics. Although we are accustomed to associate
the communities that settled Maryland and Pennsylvania with
broad religious toleration, and although such was the intention of the founders of both communifies, yet in Maryland,
after the accession of William and Mary, severe penal laws
were enacted, and every Roman Catholic was prohibited from
teaching a school in the province. The education of children
in this faith, therefore, was obtained with difficulty either
abroad or privately in their families. So it happened that the
father had graduated from the famous Jesuits' College of St.
Omer's.
He married, in the year of 1770, Monica Brooke, the
daughter of another planter of Maryland. Roger Brooke
was one of seven children of this union, being the third child
and the second son.
The Revolution having removed all difficulty on the score of
religion and the constitution in the State of Maryland, in 1776,
having placed all persons professing the Christian religion on
an equal footing, the child was sent to a public school and
then put under the charge of a private tutor, and thus prepared to enter Dickinson College. In his autobiography he
describes his journey, after the spring vacation in 17 9 2, to
reach Carlisle:
"We embarked on board of one of the schooners employed in
transporting produce and goods between the Patuxent River and
Baltimore, and, owing to unfavorable winds, it was a week before
we reached our port of destination; and, as there was no stage or
any other public conveyance between Baltimore and Carlisle, we
were obliged to stay at an inn until we could find a wagon returning to Carlisle, and not too heavily laden to take our trunks
and allow us occasionally to ride in it. This we at length accom-
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plished, and in that way proceeded to Carlisle, and arrived safely,
making the whole journey from our homes in about a fortnight."
It is more than a century now since Taney graduated with
the degree of Bachelor of Arts in the fall of 1795. During
the period of his studentship he went home but twice, by
reason of the difficulties of the journey, walking all the way
from Carlisle to Baltimore, a distance of eighty-five miles, in
a little over two days. He says of his college life that, taken
altogether, it was a plea:sant one. He boarded with James
McCormick, the professor of mathematics, to whose kindness
and patience he pays tribute. H" speaks, too, of Dr. Nisbet,
"whose share of the college duties was ethics, logic, metaphysics and criticism." Also of Dr. Robert Davidson, who
lectured on history, natural philosophy and geography, and
of Charles Huston, professor of Latin and Greek, the last
named becoming a distinguished jurist himself and one of the
judges of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Upon his graduation, young Taney was the valedictorian of
his class. He speaks of his effort in a way that indicates that
it was a severe trial to him; and that you may have some
notion of what a commencement was in those days, I shall
quote again from his autobiography, a fragment of which, unfortunately incomplete, may be found fn Tyler's Life:
"The commencement was held in a large Presbyterian church,
in which Dr. Nisbet and Dr. Davidson preached alternately. A
large platform of unplaned plank was erected in this church in
front of the pulpit and touching it, and on a level with its floor.
From this platform the graduate spoke, without even, I think, a
single rail on which he could rest his hand while speaking. In
front of him was a crowded audience of ladies and gentlemen ;
behind him, on the right, sat the professors and trustees in the
segment of the circle, and on the left, in like order, sat the graduates who were to speak after him; and in the pulpit, concealed
from public view, sat some fellow-student, with the oration in his
hand, to prompt the speaker if his memory should fail him. I
evidently could not have been very vain of my oration, for I never
called on my prompter for it, and have never seen it since it was
delivered, nor do I know what became of it. I sat on this platform, while oration after oration was spoken, awaiting my turn,
thinking over what I had to say, and trying to muster up courage
enough to speak it with composure. But I was sadly frightened,

ROGER BROOKE TANEY.

and trembled in every limb, and my voice was husky and unmanageable. I was sensible of all this-much mortified by it-and
my feeling of mortification made matters worse. Fortunately, my
speech had been so well committed to memory, that I went through
without the aid of the prompter. But the pathos of leave-taking
from the professors and my classmates, which had been so carefully
worked out in the written oration, was, I doubt not, spoiled by the
embarrassment under which it was delivered."
This recital gives an impression of the highly nervous temperament of the future Chief Justice, and of the strength of
will he must have had to have overcome it as he did ; for notwithstanding his long life, for the most part amid the full blaze
of public criticism, he was troubled with trepidation in public"
speaking to the last. In the spring of 1796 Mr. Taney entered the office of Judge Chase, of the General Court of
Maryland, at Annapolis, that being the place, he says
"from the character of the judges of the General Court, of the
bar who attended it, and the business transacted in it . . . of all

others in the state, where a man should study law, if he expected
to attain eminence in his profession."
His student life was one of unremitting labor. Each man
must choose for himself that mental regimen which seems
best fitted for his advancement, and I, for one, do not advise a
student to take the career of any man, no matter how great
he may be, and set before him his rules with the determination to adhere to them slavishly, He must consider differences in temperament, time, place and general surroundings,
but no one will regret concentration of purpose and steady
work to the limit of his capacity; and the example of men
like Taney is well calculated to inspire them. Let me quote
again his own views upon what he did, and his advice to one
situated as he was :
"I determined not to go into society until I had completed my
studies, and I adhered to that determination. In the midst of the
highly polished and educated society for which that city was at that
time distinguished, I never visited in any family, and respectfully
declined the kind and hospitable invitations I received. I associated only with the students, and studied closely. I have for weeks
together read law twelve hours in the twenty-four. But I am convinced that this was mistaken diligence, and that I should have
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-profited more if I had read law four or five hours and spent some
more hours in thinking it over and considering the principle it established, and the cases to which it might be applied. And I am
satisfied, also, that it would have been much better for me if I had
occasionally mixed in the society of ladies and of gentlemen older
than the students. My thoughts would often have been more
cheerful and my mind refreshed for renewed study, and I should
have acquired more ease and self-possession in conversation with
men eminent for their talents and position, and learned from them
many things which law books do not teach. I suffered much and
often from this want of composure and from the consciousness of
embarrassment when I emerged from my seclusion and came into
the social and business world."
He goes on to say that his reading in the office of a judge
was not without its disadvantages, remarking:
"In the office of a lawyer in full practice the attention of the
student is daily called to such matters, and he is employed in
drawing declarations and pleas, special and general, until the usual
forms become familiar to his mind, and he learns, by actual practice in the office, the cases in which they should be respectively
used, and what averments are material and what are not. The
want of this practical knowledge and experience was a serious inconvenience to me, and, for some time after I commenced practice,
I did not venture to draw the most ordinary form of a declaration
or plea without a precedent before me ; and if the cause of action
required a declaration varying in any degree from the ordinary
money counts, or the defence required a special plea, I found it
necessary to examine the principles of pleading which applied to
it, and endeavored to find a precedent for a case of precisely that
,character. Nor was it so easy, in that day, for an inexperienced
young lawyer to satisfy himself upon a question of special pleading. Chitty had not made his appearance, and you were obliged
to look for the rule in Comyn's Digest or Bacon's Abridgment, or
Viner's Abridgment, and the cases to which they referred; and I
have sometimes gone back to Lilly's Entries and Doctrina Placitandi in searching for a precedent."
As we all know who are engaged in active practice, and as
you have, no doubt, been taught in this law school, the old
science of pleading, the study of which made such eminent
lawyers, has given place to a system in my judgment far
better; but reforms in the law, and in other things, are apt. o
have some accompanying disadvantages. The abolition of
the study of pleading, except in its superficial outlines, has
produced a carelessness and lack of accurate and close think-
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ing at the bar that old practitioners look upon with regret.
In Taney's young manhood he says:
"Strict and nice technical pleading was the pride of the bar, and
I might almost say of the court, and every disputed suit was a trial
of skill in pleading between the counsel, and a victory achieved in
that mode was much more valued than one obtained on the merits
of the case."
Young Taney attended the sessions of the General Court,
under the advice of his preceptor, tu watch the trial of causes
and the arguments of counsel and try his apprenticed hand at
reporting. He says after he came to the bar, when his experience was more mature, that he threw these reports intothe fire, being satisfied, when he read them, "that no one was
fit for a reporter who was not an accomplished la-wyer." He
advises against moot courts, taking the opinion of his preceptor, who thought them an encouragement to young men
to argue with insufficient knowledge of the subjects they discussed. He says the danger is that the student will bring the
habit with him to the bar, and
"he will sometimes find that it would have been better to have
been silent than to have spoken. All the lawyers of Maryland,
who have risen to eminence and leadership, were trained in the
manner described and advised by Mr. Chase."
Here, again, I would venture to suggest that the character
and temperament of the student should be considered.
I
cannot but think that moot courts are very excellent aids in
stimulating inquiry, and what may, perhaps, be called, for lack
of a better term, original research in the law. Competent
jurists have complimented the arguments of law students delivered in the ancient Law Academy of Philadelphia, an institution founded for the express purpose of teaching the student
and the young lawyer 'practical methods of conducting business, including arguments before the Supreme Court. There
is, undoubtedly, however, a disadvantage to many a young
man who, having a facility of speech and of constructing sentences, that when tested by their last analysis convey little or
no meaning, has deceived himself and possibly others into the
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notion that he was a forensic orator because of his achievements in bodies of this kind.
There were great lawyers in Maryland, as in Pennsylvania,
in those early days. Mr. Taney speaks of Luther Martin,
-Philip Barton Key, John Thompson Mason, John Johnson,
Arthur Shaaff, James Winchester and William Pinkney.
Listening to such men in action, and inspired by their success in a profession that requires first of all an absolute devotion to it, and an ambition for success not easily discouraged,
after studying closely for three years, in the spring of 1799 he
was admitted to the bar. He was still afflicted by nervousness,
which, as I have said, never entirely left him. He attributes
his misfortune to his delicate health, saying:
"That it was infirm from my earliest recollection; my system
was put out of order by slight exposure; and I could not go
through the excitement and mental exertion of a court, which
lasted two or three weeks, without feeling, at the end of it, that
my strength was impaired and I needed repose."
Acting upon the advice of his .father, Mr. Taney settled in
Calvert county and became a candidate for the General Assembly of Maryland, and was elected.
During the session of the legislature he was more often in
general society, though he complains that a defective vision
often made him feel awkward and uncomfortable lest he should
be guilty of rudeness in not speaking to someone he knew.
When the session was over, he returned to the country and
indulged himself with the reading of general literature and
the enjoyments of the beauties of nature.
" When the weather permitted," he says, "I was always out,
wandering on the shore of the river or in the woods, much of the
time alone, occupied with my own meditations, or sitting often for
hours together under the shade, and looking almost listlessly at the
prospect before me. There was always a love of the romantic about
me, and my thoughts and imaginings when alone were more frequently in that direction than in the real business life."
On the expiration of his term, Mr. Taney became a candidate again for the House of Delegates, as a Federalist, but
was defeated and his prospects for political elevation for the
time were ended. He then *made up his mind to begin the
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practice of the law at Frederick, and, in March, i 8ol, he took
up his abode in that city. Frederick was a place of considerable
importance, having mills and manufactories of -different descriptions; and, as it was situated on the Cumberland Road, the'
great highway from Baltimore and the West, it was enlivened
by the tide of travel. It required five years of residence
before Mr. Taney achieved a practice sufficiently lucrative to
make him independendent. lie had as a fellow student at
Annapolis, Francis Scott Key, whose name has been made
famous as the author of " The Star-Spangled Banner." On
January 7, i8o6, Mr. Taney married his friend's sister, Anne
Phebe Charlton Key; his marriage was -in every way a happy
one, Mrs. Taney being congenial in her temperament and'
accomplished in many ways.
One of Mr. Taney's important cases in his early practice
was the trial of General Wilkinson, then Commander-in-chief
of the United States Army, before a military court convened
at Frederick. This was in the year I8 11. Although General
Wilkinson was personally unpopular and was prosecuted by
the ablest counsel, he was acquitted. Mr. Taney was again
a candidate of his party for the House of Representatives
about the year 1812, but was again defeated. In 1816, however, he became a member of the State Senate, and achieved
a fine reputation in that body.
In those days the feeling against slavery had not extended
so far as in later times, but there was a strong feeling of
antagonism against it. Naturally, there was much excitement
in Maryland, a slave holding community, when the institution
was attacked in public speech. A Mr. Gruber, a minister in
good standing in the Methodist Church, preaching at a campmeeting in Washington county to a large audience, of whom
four hundred were negroes, in the course of his address is said
to have remarked:
"Is it not a reproach to a man to hold articles of liberty and
independence in one hand and a bloody whip in the other, while
a negro stands and trembles before him with his back cut and
bleeding," and he continued with other words equally offensive to
the peculiar institution.
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Mr. Gruber had come from Pennsylvania, and this fact
aggravated his offence; he was indicted by the grand jury as
intending to incite the slaves to insurrection, and when the
case came for trial Mr. Taney appeared as his counsel. In a
powerful address to the jury, he dwelt particularly upon the
right of freedom of speech and argued successfully that
Mr. Gruber had not gone beyond the limits of his constitutional rights. Mr. Taney's language in regard to slavery issignificant in view of his famous utterances in later life:
"A hard necessity, indeed, compels us to endure the evil slavery
for a time; it was imposed upon us by another nation while we
yet in a state of colonial vassalage. It cannot be easily or suddenly
removed, yet, while it continues it is a blot on our national
character. Every real lover of freedom confidently hopes that it
will effectually, though it must be gradually wiped away and
earnestly looks for the means by which this necessary object may be
best attained."
Mr. Gruber was acquitted.
Mr. Taney's reputation had now become great; he was retained in many important causes and his recognition grew as
years went by; he was noted for his deference to the bench,
and his exceeding courtesy and fairness towards his brother
lawyers. Mr. Tyler tells an anecdote to indicate his lofty
professional spirit. He was engaged in an ejectment cause,
and it stood ready for trial when he noticed that his opponent
was unprepared, his locations were wrong, and he would
certainly lose his case irrespective of its merits if he went to
trial. Thereupon he leaned over to his opponent and told
him the fact.
Such chivalrous courtesy should mark every practitioner
and he should stamp what is known as sharp practice wherever
he meets it. The really great men of the bar have always
risen far above sharp practice and petti-fogging methods.
As an orator, Mr. Taney seems to have relied only upon the
strength of his arguments and the sincerity with which they
were advanced. It is said of him that
"his language was always chaste and classical, and his eloquence
undoubtedly was great-sometimes persuasive and gentle, sometimes
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impulsive and overwhelming. He spoke, when excitedl, from the
feelings of his heart, and as his heart was right, he spoke with
prodigious effect."
In his dealings with the court, it was further remarked by
the same authority, Mr. William Schley of the Baltimore Bar:
"that in taking exception to the adverse rulings of the court, he
never cloaked a point, but presented it clearly and distinctly for
adjudication by the court."
Does this not suggest a thought that should be impressed
upon the minds of young men as they come to the bar; that
their admission oath requires them to act "'with all due fidelity
to the court as well as to the client?" 'And does not fidelity
to the court require an open, candid statement of the law, and
of the facts to the best knowledge of the lawyer? And should
he not feel it his duty to aid the court as far as he can by
presenting his conclusions of law with the utmost fairness and
without any conscious effort to color his formulas to meet the
immediate cause he advocates?
The retirement of the great Luther Martin and the equally,
though differently, great Pinkney, in the year 1823, left an
opening at the Baltimore Bar, and Mr. Taney removed to that
city.
Although a Federalist in politics, Mr. Taney could not
bring himself to support the attitude of that wing of his party
which found expression in the Hartford Convention during the
War of i812, and he supported the candidacy of General
Jackson for the presidency in 1824. He had no political
aspirations, but a man of his eminence could not fail to be
a factor in political life under the conditions existing at that
time in any state of the Union. He was not so well known
beyond the boarders of Maryland as his great compeer
William Wirt, but in his state, as has been said, he ranged
with the most eminent of his profession. In 1827, upon the
unanimous recommendation of the Baltimore Bar, he was
appointed Attorney-General of Maryland. Causes of the more
important kind in all branches of jurisprudence required his
professional attention, but he seems to have been especially
employed in matters of maritime law, in marine insurance, and
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the volumes of reports exhibit his skill, notably as a special
pleader.
Hitherto, we have dwelt upon the personal characteristics
and professional acquirements of Mr. Taney, as a practicing
lawyer, but the turn of events now brought him into history
as a statesman. General Jackson became President of the
United States in 1829, and owing to internal dissentions some
of the members of his cabinet resigned. Mr. Taney's attitude
during the War of 1812 subsequently gave him a political
position which, together with his professional acquirements,
had caused the President to offer him the appointment of
Attorney-General of the United States. And upon his indicating
his acquiescence, he was appointed to that exalted office in June,
1831. Hitherto, Jackson and Taney had had no personal
acquaintance, but there sprang up between them at once
a feeling of confidence and regard. At that time the President's attention had been drawn to the conduct of the Bank of
the United States, an institution chartered by the general
government situated in Philadelphia. This bank found it
necessary to apply for a re-charter because by its limitations
its original charter would expire in 1836.
In his first message to Congress, in December, 1829, the
President drew attention to this fact and indicated a doubt
whether the renewal should be granted if applied for by the
stockholders. The bank had been created by Alexander
Hamilton and had continued in existence, excepting in the
interval between 18 11 and 1816. It had been approved by
Mr. Gallatin as of great public utility during Jefferson's
administration, opposed as that great leader was to everything
that tended towards centralization. As a result of the financial
irregularities during the War of 1812 and the failure of the
state banks to produce the proper means of arranging exchanges, the Congress of the United States, upon the report
of Secretary Dallas, chartered a new United States Bank in
186. As the story is told by Charles J. Ingersoll in his
History of the Second War between the United States and
Great Britain, the bank was carried by the Republican party.
The Federalists voted against it, especially Daniel Webster,
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Jeremiah Mason, and John Sergeant, who became, says Mr.
Ingersoll, "its chief counsellors, advocates and agents."
It is evident that Jackson looked upon the United States
Bank as the incarnation of what has come to be known as the
money power and as inimical to our institutions. Whether
this was the growth of experience and observation after he
assumed the presidential chair, or as has been asserted, his
fixed intention when he assumed the presidency, isonly a.
matter of curious interest. Mr. Ingersoll says that the latter
was his feeling, and that from the intimation of his first message, he never swerved, not that he was opposed to a United
States Bank in itself, but to the bank- as then constituted.
Jackson was not alone opposed to the renewal of the National
Bank charter, but also to the continuance of the high protective policy and to the internal improvements by the Federal
Government, and upon these issues the battle was joined later
between Mr. Clay and himself as the candidates of opposing
parties for the presidency. "Three years of contest followed
between the president of the bank and the President of the
United States," after Jackson's declaration in his first annual
message, notwithstanding the fact that Congress in both
houses supported the bank and expressed disapprobation of
its destruction. Two men more unlike than these two presidents, both in early training, education and natural disposition
could hardly be found. Jackson, a man of the people,
schooled in broader experience, shrewd, unhesitating, and
with an iron nerve that upheld him in all his plans, a soldier,
moreover, accustomed to direct and simple methods; while
the president of the bank, Nicholas Biddle, was equally brave,
equally shrewd, but with a temper and education and an environment very different from that of his antagoftist.
Mr. Biddle was an eminent citizen of Philadelphia, sprung
from a distinguished family and educated in all the accomplishments that distinguish a gentleman, a strikingly handsome person, an orator and a man of force. He was the
friend and correspondent of the most distinguished men of his
time. Mr. Ingersoll says of him:
"No American had such European repute, and Jackson's was
the only one comparable and that far inferior to it."
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With antagonists of this character and with an issue so
great the battle was fought, and upon his success depended
Jackson's re-election and upon his defeat depended the continued existence of the bank.
The defeat of Mr. Clay was overwhelming. Out of two
hundred and eighty-eight votes he received but forty-nine, and
General Jackson entered upon his second term as President
of the United States with his enemy unhorsed and at his
mercy.
For a time attention was directed from the bank issues by
the Nullification Ordinance of South Carolina, but when, after
Jackson's emphatic declaration warning the people of South
Carolina of his determined purpose to maintain the authority
of the Federal Government, the difficulty was adjusted by the
passage of a new Revenue Bill introduced by Mr. Clay,
Jackson and his Attorney General appeared to have been of
one mind with regard to the continuance of the charter, and
neither were men to relax their purpose. They looked upon
the continuance of the bank as. dangerous to our political
institutions and as the exponent of a power not to be trusted.
The next move was the removal of the government deposits
that had been. so long in the bank. First came the message
recommending the sale of the seven millions of the stock of
the bank, held by the United States; with it a recommendation to investigate whether the public deposits were safe in the
bank's custody. In the House of Representatives a committee reported that in the hands of the bank the deposits
might safely be continued and this resolution was adopted.
Mr. Taney was deeply impressed with the necessity for withdrawing the deposits, and in August, 1833, wrote to the
President expressing his opinion. He says in his letter:
"My mind has for some time been made up that the continued
existence of that powerful and corrupting monopoly will be fatal
to the liberties of the people, and that no man but yourself is
strong enough to meet and destroy it; and that if your administration closes without having established and carried into operation
some other plan for the collection and distribution of the revenue,
the bank will be too strong to be resisted by any one who may
succeed you. Entertaining these opinions, I am prepared to hazard
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much in order to save the people of this country from the shackles
which a combined moneyed aristocracy is seeking to fasten upon

them."
Jackson answered:
"The United States Bank attempts to overawe us. It threatens
us with the Senate and with Congress, if we remove the deposits.
As to the Senate, threats of their power cannot control my course
or defeat my operations."
And'he continued at length, indicating, that if Mr. Duane;
the Secretary of the Treasury, should decline to carry out his
policy, he would transfer Mr. Taney from the Attorney Generalship in order that he might do so. It turned out as anticipated; the Secretary of the Treasury refused to withdraw the deposits and was removed by the President, Mr. Taney being appointed Secretary in his stead. He entered upon his duties in
the Treasury Department on the 2 4 th of September, 1833, and
on the 26th gave the order for the removal of the deposits, t
the same time notifying the various banks that they had been.
selected as depositories for the public money instead -of the
United States Bank. The consequences were immediate, and
most painful; the loans and discounts of the banks amounting
to more than seventy millions were immediately called in, the
bank alleging that the loss of the deposits compelled it to this
action. The state banks were compelled to the same course,
and the paper currency being thus suddenly contracted, a vast
train of financial difficulties resulted. A panic came upon the
country unprecedented in its history.
"Commerce became embarrassed. Property became unsalable.
The price of produce and labor was reduced to the lowest point.
Thousands and tens of thousands of laborers were thrown out of
employment; and many wealthy people were reduced to poverty.
The friends of the bank were involved in cominon ruin with its
enemies."
When Congress met in December, I833, the President
boldly accused the bank of a misuse of its powers, especially
asserting that
"in violation of the express provisions of its charter, it had by
a formal resolution, placed its funds at the disposition of its president, to be employed in sustaining the political power of the
bank."
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He then explains the appointment of the new Secretary and
ascribes to the efforts of the bank "to control public opinion
through the distresses of some and the fears of others," the
panic that existed. Mr. Taney addressed a letter to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives explaining his action.
There was no doubt of his legal right to remove the public
moneys, and the question to be answered related only to its
expediency. The Secretary did not hesitate to place his
opposition to the renewal of the bank's charter upon the
ground of its great power, it being, said he,
"a fixed principle of our political institutions to guard against the
unnecessary accumulation of power over persons and property in
any hands. And no hands are less worthy to be trusted than those
of a moneyed corporation."
Although the Senate stoo*d by the bank in this last struggle,
the House of Representatives supported the administration,
and the renewal of the charter was refused. The policy of
General Jackson, which as we have seen, was urged upon hirr
by Mr. Taney, aroused opposition, respectable not alone from
its numbers, but from the character of its representatives,
Such names as Clay, Webster, Calhoun, McDuffie, Binney,
Adams were strenuous in their opposition.
Taney's biographer sees nothing to criticise adversely in the
conduct of the administration, and explains the evils resulting
from the conflict with no little force, remarking:
"When a government has instituted a policy even of ultimate
ruin, interests spring up under that policy, upon which thousands
of fortunes depend, that must suffer in the transition to even a
policy which only can save the country from destruction. Of all
powers on earth, the money power is the most mighty, the most
unscrupulous, the most craving, the most unrelenting, and the most
sure to have devotees. It has not only bought individuals, but
governments, and, in fact, the ruling majority of nations. And
there is nothing so fatal to all that is great in man as the dominion
of money. There is no more important civil achievement in the
working of our Government than the overthrow of the bank of the
(Tyler, page 217.)
United States."
Having accomplished this prodigious work., Mr. Taney met
the brunt of the opposition and was refused confirmation as
Sec- ar , " -f the Treasury, when near the close of the session
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in June, 1834, his name was sent to the Senate. Thereupon
he resigned, taking with him the approval of his own conscience, the earnest thanks of the president, and the denunciation of those who were opposed to his policy.
There can be little doubt now-that more than sixty years
have rolled by since the fierce and embittered contest to
which we have made reference-that Jackson and Taney were
right in their opposition to the concentration of power in the
great Corporation which they slew; but, whether they were
right or wrong, no one can fail to admire the strength and
courage they showed. But at that time, in the face of distress
and suffering resulting from the battle, there was a large body
who looked upon Jackson as being little less than a madman,
and Taney, to use Webster's expression, as his "pliant instrument." Taney's motives are thus set forth by himself:
"It was obvious to my mind, from the facts before me, that a
great moneyed corporation, possessing a fearful power for good or
for evil, had entered into the field of political warfare, and was deliberately preparing its plans to obtain, by means of its money,
an irresistible political influence in the affairs of the nation, so as
to enable it to control the measures of the government. It was evident, if this ambitious corporation should succeed in its designs,
that the liberties of the country would soon be destroyed; that the
power of self-government would be wrested from the people, and
they would find themselves, at no distant day, under the dominion
of the worst of all possible governments-a moneyed aristocracy.
In this posture of affairs, full of peril and of the deepest interest to
this great nation, I saw the gray-haired patriot now at the head of
the government, who has so often breasted every danger in defence
of the liberties of his country, once more prepared to plant himself
in the breach, to defend his countrymen, at every hazard to himself, from the impending danger. I firmly believe and still believe,
that the safety of the country depended on his prompt and decisive
action. I had long, as one of his cabinet, advised the proceeding
which he finally made up his mind to adopt. . . . It was impossible, in a crisis when the dearest interests of the country were at
stake, that I would, without just disgrace, have refused to render
my best services in its defence. I should have been unworthy of
the friendship of the high-spirited and patriotic citizens who are
now around me if I could have thought of myself and my own
poor interests at such a moment."
With his rejection by the Senate in 1834" Mr. Taney retired
for a brief while from public life, but in 1835 the resignation
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of Mr. Justice Gabriel Duvall made a vacancy among the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States,
and Mr. Taney's name was again sent to the Senate for this
great office. It was an interesting fact that it was before
Judge Duvall that Taney had argued his first case in the
Mayor's Court of Annapolis, and now he found himself named
as his successor. The Senate did not reject, but indefinitely
postponed the nomination, so that it fell.
Chief Justice Marshall, after presiding over the court for
thirty-four years-he having taken his seat on the bench at
the February Term, 18oi-died in the summer of 1835, and
on the 28th of December of that year Mr. Taney was nominated to fill his place. Notwithstanding the opposition, led
by Clay and Webster, his nomination was confirmed. It is
interesting to know that Marshall himself had expressed a desire for his confirmation when named for the Duvall vacancy,
thus giving evidence of his own appreciation of his successor's learning and character.
Of his career as Chief Justice, speaking of him strictly
from a professional point of view, one cannot enlarge within
the limits of an address. His opinions, says George W.
Biddle,
"contained in thirty-two volumes of reports, beginning with ii
Peters and ending with 2 Black, are distinguished by their clearness, learning, directness and firm grasp of the points discussed,
and, wher dealing with constitutional subjects, for sound and
weighty ruasoning, thorough acquaintance with the political history
of the cc.antry, and for the close bearing of all contained in them
ulon the question under examination." (Political Science Lectures,
Univ. of Michigan, 1889, p. 125).
Questions covering the whole range of jurisprudence were
presented for consideration and argued at the bar of the court
by men unexcelled in learning and ability-questions of farreaching constitutional importance. Chief Justice Marshall
had set up the landmarks upon the field of constitutional law
which have rarely been moved by later decisions. So his
successor, though differing at times in his point of view, continued the work of development and set stricter limits where
necessary.
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We shall glance at a few of his decisions. In the famous
case of C/harles Rivor Bridge v. Warren Bridge, i i Peters,
420, the case had been argued before Chief Justice Marshall,
but not then decided. The provision of the Federal Constitution prohibiting states from passing any law impairing the
obligation of the contracts was interpreted. It was contended
that an exclusive privilege had been granted to thp Charles
River Bridge, and, therefore, the Warren Bridge could not be
erected, as the act of the Legislature of Massachusetts, authorizing the erection of the Warren Bridge, impaired the implied contract contained in the charter of the Charles River
Bridge. But the Chief Justice held that public grants must
be construed strictly, and that we cannot,
"by legal and mere technical reasoning, take away from them any
portion of that power over their own internal policy and improvement which is necessary to their well-being and prosperity."
Mr. Justice Story, one of the most eminent men who have
ever graced the American bench, and whose text-books have
been for years manuals for students of law, dissented from the
Chief Justice, and viewed with melancholy the tendency of
the court. He was fearful lest the principle of the Dartmouth
College case should be obliterated. But, says Mr. Biddle:
"Unless the luxuriant growth, the result of the decision in 4
Wheaton, had been lopped and cut away by the somewhat trenchant reasoning of the Chief Justice, the whole field of legislation
would have been choked and rendered useless in time to come, for
the production of any laws that would have met the needs of the
increasing and highly developed energies of a steadily advancing
community."
Another case in which Justices Story and McKinley dissented from a majority of the court was that of Groves v.
Slaughter,where it was decided that the constitution of Mississippi was not self-enforcing, but required an act of the legislature to carry into effect its provision against the introduction of slaves into that state as merchandise for sale. Chief
Justice Taney concurred with the majority of the court and
gave this significant judgment, that it was for the states to decide for themselves alone whether or not they would allow
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slaves to be brought within their limits from another state,
either for sale or for any other purpose, and adding the
thought that Congress could not control their action by any
constitutional power. (I5 Peters, 449.)
Another great case in which the opinion of the court, delivered by the Chief Justice, involving the ownership of certain land covered by the waters of the Bay of Amboy, in the
State of New Jersey, decided that the title of the soil under
navigable rivers remained in the ownership of the state as
part of
"' the prerogative rights annexed to the political powers conferred
upon the original proprietary grantee of the crown, to which the
state had succeeded, and did not pass as private property."
One of the great slave cases, if they may be so called, is
that of Prigg v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, I6 P.
539, wherein it was decided that the Act of Assembly of
Pennsylvania of March 25, 1826, under which the plaintiff in
error was convicted of kidnapping, was unconstitutional. In
this case the Chief Justice dissented from the opinion of the
court delivered by Justice Story, that the Congress alone had
power to legislate on the subject of fugitive slaves. The facts
of this case Were these: Prigg, a citizen of Maryland, had
kidnapped a fugitive slave in Pennsylvania and had restored
her to her owner in Maryland. He was indicted for this in
Pennsylvania, under a law which declared that the taking of
any negro or mulatto by force from the state was a felony.
The act provided a means whereby fugitive slaves could be
returned legally, requiring a hearing before a magistrate, and
this act had been violated by Prigg. When the case came
before the court on the part of Prigg the Pennsylvania act
was held unconstitutional, because the Constitution had provided that the remedy should be exclusive in Congres:, and
the states were prohibited from passing any law upo i the
subject. Chief Justice Taney, although concurring w::h the
majority of the court, did not agree in this view of the powers
of the states, holding that, so long 4s they did nothing to impair the law as enacted by Congress, there being no express
condition, they could make any regulations they chose on the
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subject. This was a case in which, while the entire court
concurred in the conclusion that the act was unconstitutional,
they differed widely in the reasons that lead them to this
conclusion. The decision reached in this case led Congress
to attempt later to meet some of the objections raised by the
court by the famous Fugitive Slave law, passed in 185o; but
the question can never be said to have been finally settled to
the satisfaction of the people until the Civil War solved it for.
all time.
One of the greatest cases, in its far-reaching effects upon
the commerce of the country, decided by the court in 1847, in
which the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Wayne and
concurred in by the Chief Justice, was that of Waring v.
Clarke, 5 Howard, 44I, which extended the maritime jurisdiction of the United States Court to the navigable rivers and
the great inland waters, irrespective of the old English test of
the ebb and flow of the tides. It may seem strange at this
time that it should have been contended that rules governing
the jurisdiction of admiralty courts upon the comparatively insignificant waters of the Island of Great Britain could be
invoked to fetter the commerce of the Great Lakes or the
Mississippi River. And yet there were strong dissents to the
view taken by the majority of the court in this case. The decision in Waring v. Clarke was subsequently sustained and
reaffirmed by the Chief Justice in the case of the Genesee
Chief, where it was held by the Chief Justice that an act of
Congress extending maritime jurisdiction was entirely constitutional.
It would be an unnecessary labor to attempt a critical
review of Chief Justice Taney's great decisions during the
first half of his term. So many subjects were embraced, so
perspicuous were his judgments that each is worthy of separate
consideration. The student must read them in the original
reports for a thorough knowledge, and for one merey
historical, he will find in Mr. Biddle's paper, already alluded
to, and in Mr. Carson's History of the Supreme Court, a commentary that will repay his reading. Mr. Carson is not carried
away by admiration for the successor of Judge Marshall, to
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whom his unbounded admiration is paid, and it.was no lightly
expressed conviction which inspired this passage in his History.
"On the whole the work accomplished by Taney and his associates
during the first fourteen years of his term, was quite as essential to
the full realization of our welfare as a nation and an accurate appreciation of the true character of our government as any preceding
epoch in the history of the court. It served to check excesses, to
limit extravagancies of doctrines, to awaken and develop new
powers, to moderate tendencies, to introduce contrasts and elements
which in future years could be mingled and used for the preservation of the whole, as well as for the protection of each part."
(Carson, History of the Supreme Court, 336.)
Twenty years had passed since Judge Taney had taken his
seat on the bench, when, in 1856, the case of Dred Scott v.
Sanford, ig Howard, 393, was decided.
After the lapse of forty-two years it should be possible to
approach the consideration of this famous decision with calmness and impartiality, but at the time of the decision there
existed too tense a feeling between the pro-slavery and antislavery elements to permit an impartial judgment, and the
consequence was a storm of abuse directed against the venerable Chief Justice, from which his whole career, lofty, brave
and pure as it had been, should have defended him. This was
an appeal byDred Scott, a negro, from the decision of the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of Missouri. Scott
had brought an action in the United States Court to establish the
freedom of himself, his wife, and two children, claiming to be
a citizen of the State of Missouri, thus showing the court's
jurisdiction against the defendant, the administrator of his
reputed master, who was a citizen of the State of New York.
The defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court
alleging that the plaintiff being a negro of African descent,
whose ancestors had been brought to this country as slaves,
was not a citizen of Missouri.
A general demurrer was filed to this plea, and sustained by
the court, and the defendant required to answer over. The
defendant then pleaded in bar, of the action that the plaintiff,
his wife and children were slaves, and the property of the
defendant.
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At the trial the facts were agreed upon that, in 1834, Dred
Scott was a negro slave, and belonged to Dr. Emerson,
a surgeon in the Army of the United States, who took him toa military post at Rock Island, Illinois, and held him there till
1836 as a slave. Dr. Emerson then removed the plaintiff to
Fort Snelling, north of 360 3o ' and north of the State of
Missouri, where he held him as a slave till 1836.
In 1835, Harriet, a negro slave of Major Taliaferro, an
officer in the army, was taken by her master to Fort Snelling,
where she was held as a slave until 1838, having been sold in
the meantime to Dr. Emerson.
In 1836, the plaintiff and Harriet, with the consent of Dr.
Emerson, inter-married at Fort Snelling, and had two children,
one born north of the north line of Missouri, and another
within that state.
In 1838, Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff and his wife and
children to the State of Missouri where they have since resided.
Before the commencement of the suit, Dr. Emerson sold the
family to the defendant as slaves, and the defendant had ever
since claimed them as such.
Previous to this action, Dred Scott brought suit for his freedom in the Circuit Court of St. Louis Co., and obtained a
verdict and judgment in his favor, but on writ of error to the
Supreme Court of the state, the judgment below was reversed,
and the case remanded to the Circuit Court of the state to
await the decision of this case. At the trial, the jury, under
instructions from the court, found a verdict that the plaintiff,
his wife and children were negro slaves, the lawful property of
the defendant. Upon this verdict, judgment was entered for
the defendant, and the plaintiff filed exceptions to the instructions of the court. Upon these exceptions the case came up
on writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States.
When the record reached the court, it presented two
questions: r. Whether Scott by reason of his African descent,
irrespective of the question of his personal freedom, could be
a citizen " of the States of the Union."
2. Whether the fact that Scott having been a slave in the
state of Missouri, after being taken by his master to a free
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state, and thence into that part of the Louisiana purchase,
north of the parallel of 360 30'. " where slavery was prohibited
under the Act of Congress known as the Missouri Compromise
Act, and then being brought back to the State of Missouri,
was, in legal effect, emancipated by residence with his master
in a free state or a free territory, so that the condition of servitude would not re-attach to him on his return into Missouri."
The first question was involved in the decison of the court
in the plea to the jurisdiction. If the court below was wrong
in sustaining the demurrer to this plea, and its action should be
reversed, it would not be necessary to enter into any consideration of the merits of the case. The only necessary order
would have been a mandate to the court below to dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction. If, however, the court should
hold with the court below that it was compatible with citizenship to be a negro of pure African descent, then the second
question would have to be decided, whether residence such as
had been held by Scott and his family in a free state, and in
the Louisiana Territory, north 360 30' would entitle him to
freedom.
The second question involved (a.) a consideration of the
effect of the residence in a foreign state upon the status of a
slave in Missouri, and, (b.) the right of Congress to prohibit
slavery in any portion of the Territory of the United States as
well as the effect of such prohibition upon the status of the
slave in Missouri.
The case was first argued at the December Term of the
Supreme Court in 1835, and it was then decided, in conference,
that it would not be necessary to decide the question of Scott's
citizenship under the plea to the jurisdiction, but that the case
should be disposed of by an examination of its merits, i. e., by
deciding whether he was a freeman or slave upon the facts
agreed upon by the parties under the plea in bar of the action.
The question to be decided in this view of the case was
merely whether the removal of Scott, by the temporary residence of his master out of the State of Missouri, affected his
status in that state. This question was already res adjudicata
in Missouri, the Supreme Court having decided to the effect
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that Scott's removal had not emancipated him,--a decision at
variance with other decisions of the State Supreme Court, but
the last one on the point.
Mr. Justice Nelson was assigned to write an opinion enbodying this view of the case, which he did, JJ. Curtis and
McLean dissenting. In commenting upon this opinion, George
Ticknor Curtis says:
"The astuteness with which this opinion avoided a decision of
the question arising out of the residence of Scott in a Territory of
the United States, where slavery was prohibited by an Act of Congress, and the remarkable subtilty of the reasoning that this, too,
was a matter for the state court to decide,.because the law of the
territory could have no extra territorial force except such as the
State of Missouri might extend to it under the comity of nations,
show very distinctly that, after the first argument of the case in the
Supreme Court, it was not deemed by a majority of the bench to be
either necessary or prudent to express any opinion upon the constitutional power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the Territories of
the United States. It was said, in the opinion prepared by Judge
Nelson, that even conceding for the purposes of the argument, that
this provision of the Act of Congress is valid within the territory
for which it was enacted, it can have no operation or effect beyond
its limits, or within the jurisdiction of a state. . . . Our conclusion,
therefore, is upon this branch of the case, that the question involved
is one depending solely upon the law of Missouri, and that the
Federal Court, sitting in the state and trying the case before us,
was bound to follow it."
Mr. Curtis remarks very justly:
"If this view of the case had been adhered to by a majority of
the court, no judge would have placed himself on record as holding
that a free negro could not be a citizen, and therefore could not
obtain a standing in the Circuit Court, and at the same time holding, under a subsequent plea to the merits, that he had no claim to
freedom, because the Congress of the United States had no power
to prohibit slavery in the National domain."
Shortly after the opinion of Justice Nelson had been written,
and, of course, before it was promulgated, Justice Wayne proposed a re-argument of the case, and it was ordered for the
ensuing term upon the two questions:
i. Whether, after plaintiff had demurred and the court had
given judgment on the demurrer in favor of plaintiff and had
ordered the defendant to answer over, and the defendant had
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pleaded to the merits, the Appellate Court can take notice of
the facts admitted in the record by the demurrer, so as to
decide whether the court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause.
2. Whether or not, assuming the court is bound to take
notice of the facts appearing upon the record, the plaintiff is a
citizen of the State of Missouri within the meaning of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.
"It will be seen that these questions," says Curtis, "in substance and in terms related to the facts set up in the plea to
the jurisdiction, and to the power of the Appellate Court to act
upon those facts after that plea had been overruled by the Circuit
Court and the defendant had been ordered to plead to the merits,
and on those facts set forth in the plea to the jurisdiction to determine the citizenship of the plaintiff. If the facts of Scott's African
descent and the slavery of his ancestors set up in the plea to the
jurisdiction could be rightly taken notice of in the Appellate Court,
as admitted by the plaintiff's demurrer to that plea, and if it should
be held that these facts amounted in law to proof that he was not
a "citizen," then there was nothing that could in judicial propriety
be done but to order the case to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. But if it should be held that on these facts, assuming that
the Appellate Court was bound to notice them, Scott was a citizen,
within the meaning of the Judiciary Act, then, and only then, it
would be necessary for the judge to act upon the merits of the case,
and as a part of the merits to determine the constitutional validity
of the Missouri Compromise restriction."
Unfortunately for the fame of the Chief Justice and of the
court, one of its justices, Wayne, conceived the idea that the
opportunity had come for the court to decide the question of
the extension of slavery in the territories by deciding that
Congress had no right to prohibit its introduction, and that
the Missouri Compromise Act was null as beyond the power
of Congress to enact. Chief Justice Taney and Justices Catron
and Grier concurred in the views of Justice Wayne, and accordingly the Chief Justice wrote an opinion which, when
promulgated, set the country in a flame. As analyzed by Mr.
Biddle his opinion asserts the following propositions:
" . A free negro of the African race whose ancestors were
brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a citizen within
the meaning of the Constitution.
"2.
The judgment of the Circuit Court was, therefore, erro-
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neous, as it had no jurisdiction of the controversy between the
parties.
"3. Scott was a slave. The law making the Territory of Wisconsin free territory is unconstitutional and void.
"4. The Missouri Compromise Act of March, x82o, is unconstitutional and void."
No one, with any knowledge of character, would question
at this time the absolute integrity of motive on the part of the
Chief Justice in rendering this decision, but fairness requires
that we should pronounce it an error of enormous consequence-all the worse because committed by going outside
the legitimate field of judicial decision. As Mr. Carson says:
"Without entering into technical niceties, it is perhaps sufficient
to say that the general judgment of the profession, irrespective of
the political question involved, is to the effect that the court after
holding upon consideration of the plea in abatement that Dred
Scott was not a citizen of the United States ought to have dismissed
the case, without entering upon the consideration of the second
question involved, and that in doing so they transcended the proper
bounds of judicial authority and indulged in mere obiter dicta of no
legal validity or conclusiveness."
And Mr. Biddle expresses the view
"that the Chief justice in an anxious endeavor to carry out the
views so often expressed by him as to the right of the individual
states to deal exclusively with the subject of this domestic relation
has been carried beyond the proper limitations within which it
should have been confined."
He bases his views upon this
reasoning:
A. The plea in abatement simply raised the question whether a
free person of African descent, whose ancestors were slaves, was a
citizen entitled to sue.

.

.

.

Now it was shown by Curtis, J.,

his opinion that in several states, notably North Carolina, at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution free negroes were citizens.
Therefore the plea was bad.
B. The legislation by Congress, including the celebrated Act of
6th March, 1820, was justified by the Constitution. The article
in question which the Chief Justice said applied only to the territory ceded by Virginia and some other states (Northwest Territory) had no such restricted meaning. This is clear.
x. By the history of the times. 2. By the inherent force of the
words of the Article (Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 2). 3. By
all fair and reasonable rules of construction, including contemporaneous construction.
C. Lastly the courts of Missouri had no right to disregard the
law, and to reverse their original decisions, nor was the Federal
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Supreme Court bound to follow the last decision of the highest
court of this state under the circumstances presented."
While it is true that six of the eight Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court concurred with the Chief Justice in holding
that Dred Scott was a slave and that the judgment of the
Circuit Court should be affirmed, each of these judges filed a
separate opinion, and their views upon the various questions
involved were for the most part very divergent. The great
opinion on the Dred Scott case is not that of the Chief Justice, but that of Mr. Justice B. R. Curtis, of which Mr. Biddle
says, "hardly too much can be said in praise of this masterly
effort."
Justice Curtis having affirmed the ruling of the court below
in favor of its jurisdiction, in sustaining the demurrer to the
plea filed, which alleged that his African ancestry debarred
Scott from citizenship, proceeded to show that while the question of the power of Congress was not legitimately before the
court, under the view of the majority, yet as the court had
jurisdiction in his view, he proceeded to consider the case on
its merits. He shows by a powerful reasoning that the court
below was wrong in its decision and that it should be reversed.
At this distance of time, with a new generation grappling
with new issues, it requires an effort of the imagination to appreciate the enormous sensation caused by the Dred Scott
decision. One of the counsel, a brother of Judge Curtis, in
his memoir of his distinguished brother, gives his opinion as
follows:
"The course of the majority of the judges in this case of Dred
Scott precipitated the action of causes which produced our Civil
War, and which would otherwise have lain dormant until the
period of danger to the Union, arising out of the existence of
slavery, had passed by . . . On the one hand, without the stimulus afforded by the ' decision,' there would have been no adequate cause for the formation in the Northern States of a geographical party with professed efforts aimed at the supposed predominance of the ' slave power' in the councils of the nation.
On the other hand, without the new and unnecessary stimulus of
this supposed 'decision,' Southern feeling in regard to the importance of a theoretical right to carry slaves into the territories
must have died a natural death. . . . Thus a great misfortune,
for which the people should not be blamed, because it was not
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solely by the arts of demagogues or politicians that their confidence
in the court was impaired. That confidence was impaired in the
minds of men whom no arts of the demagogue or politician could
reach. A vast majority of the legal profession throughout the
whole North, and some of the best legal minds in the South, alike
rejected the supposed decision and were alike dissatisfied."
(Curtis, Life of B. R. Curtis, i97, x98).
Under such provocation attacks were made upon the Chief
Justice of a character too outrageous to dignify by attempting
a defence. The meanest, because of the artful way in which
his language was presented, was that which attributed to him
the sentiments that a negro "had no rights which the white
man was bound to respect," when the context shows that he.
was endeavoring to state an historical fact to show'the estimation in which the unfortunate race was held at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution.
How grossly unjust it was to attribute unhumane sentiments
to this venerable man, especially in his relations with the
negro. Although born a slaveholder, he was so inimical to
the system that he manumitted all of his slaves and took the
warmest interest in their welfare. His professional abilities
were freely given in the defence of their cause. He was even
known to stop a child and help her with her bucket of water
in the streets of Washington when he was in high positionand she but a slave, the child of a despised race.
Let us turn from this, the one great, most unfortunate episode in a career distinguished for usefulness and lustrous with
examples, to be held up to the admiration of future generations. Let it be finally admitted, in the light of history, that,
with intentions too pure and lofty to be doubted, six Justices
of the Supreme Court committed an error, and with their
chief must bear the responsibility to a greater or less extent.
The majority went aside from the true path and fell into a
pit. Their conclusions were riddled by the inexorable logic
of Curtis and McLean, and served no other purpose than to
make a solemn warning to their successors.
When the war broke out, the Chief Justice, now venerable
with a great age, proceeded, amidst the heated excitement of
the times and even in the clash of arms, to administer the
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laws with a calmness and unchangeable dignity that extorted
admiration even from his enemies. His stern determination
to 'maintain the supremacy of the National Government in
matters within its domain was exemplified in the case of
Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard, 506, where the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin had decided that the Fugitive Slave law was
unconstitutional and resisted its enforcement. In his opinion
the Chief Justice observes :
"Now it certainly can be no humiliation to a citizen of a republic to yield a ready obedience to the laws as administered by
the constituted authorities. On the contrary, it is among his first
and highest duties as a citizen, because free government cannot
exist without it; nor can it be inconsistent with the dignity of a
sovereign state to observe faithfully, and in the spirit of sincerity
and truth, the compact into which it voluntarily entered when it
became a state of this Union. On the contrary, the highest honor
of sovereignty is untarnished -faith; and certainly no faith could
be more deliberately and solemnly pledged than that which every
state plighted to the other states to support the Constitution as it
is, in all its provisions, until they shall be altered in the manner
which the Constitution itself prescribes."
Such was the attitude of this great jurist on the question of
the sovereignty of the National Government; but when the
officers of that government exceeded their authority, not all
the terror of military force could swerve him from rebuking
the action.
In Expartc fffcrryman, (Campbell's Reports, 246), a citizen
of Baltimore was arrested in May, 186i, by a military force
under order of Major-General Cadwalader, of the United States
Army, and imprisoned in Fort McHenry. Upon petition of the
prisoner a writ of habeas corpus was issued by Chief Justice
Taney, sitting at chambers, directing the commandant of the
fort to produce the body of the prisoner the next day. When
the writ had been served, the officer made return declining to
obey it, (i) because the petitioner had been arrested, by order of
the Major-General commanding, on a charge of treason in being
"publicly associated with and holding a commission as lieutenant in a company having in their possession arms belonging to
the United States, and avowing his purpose of armed hostility
against the government; (2) that the officer having the peti-
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tioner in custody was duly authorized by the President of the
United States in such cases to suspend the writ of habeas
corfpus for the public safety."
The Chief Justice held these reasons to be insufficient, and
that the petitioner was entitled to be set at liberty. He issued
an attachment for contempt against General Cadwalader; but
when the marshal's returns showed that he could not serve
the writ, and the evidently superior military force made it
useless to summon the posse comitatus, he held the marshal
excused and filed an opinion upon the facts and law of the
case, showing that the writ could not be suspended without
authority of Congress. As remarked by*Mr. Tyler, in his biography:
"There is nothing more sublime in the acts of great magistrates
that give dignity to governments than this attempt of Chief Justice Taney to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution and the
civil authority in the midst of arms. His court was open, and he
sat upon the bench to administer the law. The cannon of Fort
McHenry, where Merryman was imprisoned, pointed upon the city
of Baltimore. But the Chief Justice, with the weight of eightyfour years upon him, as he left the house of his son-in-law, Mr.
Campbell,' remarked that it was likely he should be imprisoned in
Fort McHenry before night, but that he was going to court to do
his duty." (Tyler, 427.)
When we sit down in the quiet of our libraries to give a
calm judgment upon the action of the Supreme Court in the
case of Dred Scott, we shall see how, even the greatest, purest
and most dispassionate men all unconscious to themselves,
are influenced by their environment. The curse of slavery
lay upon this country like a deadly blight, and it penetrated
all classes of society in the South and warped the judgment
of men whose interests were involved in the North. It is no
reflection upon the great Chief Justice, nor upon any of his
associates, to say that they were affected by the condition of
the civilization then existing. They were men of conservative
temperament and they well hoped that the fiat of the law
would end the controversy. They were greatly mistaken. As
Mr. Biddle says, in his criticism of the decision in the case of
Priggv. The Commonwealtk of Pennsylvania:
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"In truth the subject lay beyond the domain of legislative or
judicial action. The feeling is so deep-seated in the hearts of men
to comment upon unfavorably, and to prevent, if possible, the
exercise of all authority distastefuil to their passions or their prejudices, that it is impossible to reason with it, or even to contend
against it, except by the exercise of physical force.
Especially is this so in free countries, and particularly in one
where the general level of intelligence is high, and the means for
concerted action abundant by reason of the ability for the almost
instantaneous propagation of the thoughts and opinions of the
general mass. In vain shall you attempt to appeal to the reason or
patriotism of men thus aroused.
You may demonstrate with
unerring truth that the Constitution is incapable of more than one
construction upon the point in question, and you may show with
the clearness of the noonday sun that this construction favors the
obnoxious practice. You may further prove from the history of the
times, with an accuracy which admits of no challenge, that the
compact by which the several states were fused into one united
body woild never have taken place without the concession which
is found enacted into words in the instrument of union. You may
talk of duty, justice, fairness, submission to the laws; but you talk
against the wind in doing so. When men's passions are aroused
they no longer reason.
Passion is at one end of the line,
reason at the other, and the latter is always outweighed by the
former. Men simply rely upon their feelings as their principle of
action; and especially do they do this when they can indulge in
the luxury of gratifying these feelings without expense to their
pockets. Adam Smith wrote, nearly a hundred years ago, that the
resolution by which our ancestors in Pennsylvania set at liberty
their negro slaves, must satisfy us that their number then could not
have been very great in that state, and before making this statement
he had demonstrated ' that the work done by slaves, though it
appears to cost only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of
any kind of labor.' "
It is not my purpose, nor do I think it to be within the
scope of a paper of this kind, to attempt to describe the pri-

vate life of Chief Justice Taney, but it is necessary for a just
appreciation of his character to know something of his habits
of life. With the sincerity that was one of his most notable
attributes, he carried out unostentatiously, but with perfect
consistency, his conception of his duties towards Almighty
God; never swerving from his faith in the Holy Roman
Catholic Church. He obeyed its requirements down to the
smallest detail. I have been told by one who often saw him
in his declining years, that it was his custom to attend Mass
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daily and his slight spare form was a familiar figure on the
streets of Washington in the early hours of the morning on
his way to and from his church. He was scrupulously exact
in the performance of official duty' yet he was loved and rev-'
erenced by all his associates. It was said of him by a political opponent (Mr. Lamon),
"Chief Justice Taney was the greatest and best man I ever knew.
I never went into his presence on business, that his gracious courtesy and kind consideration did not make me feel that I was a
better man for being in his presence."
When in his eighty-eighth year, but a short time before his
death, one of the members of his family asked him for a sentiment with his autograph, he chose the well-worn, but always
impressive lines of Horace:
"Justum et tanacem propositi virum
Non civium ardor prava jubentium,
Non vultus instantis tyranni,
Mente quatit solida."

And surely they were descriptive of his own character; just
and tenacious of his views, he could not be shaken by any
threat from their defence when occasion required.
On the l2th of October, 1864, his illustrious career closed.
I think from what has been said, you will need no words of
eulogy to impress upon your minds the examples it has shown
for the emulation not only of lawyers, but of all good men.
It was said of him by a venerable jurist, Charles O'Conor, "I
will not attempt the hopeless task of intensifying by mere
words the strong emotions of affectionate and reverential
regret for our great loss universally felt. Those who knew
Chief Justice Taney, who witnessed in his administration of
justice the gracious dignity of his bearing, and the stern impartiality of his judgment find in their own vivid recollections
a voice with which mine cannot compete. Those who have
not enjoyed that high privilege will gather from the perusal
of his recorded decisions far better conceptions of his worth
and intellectual greatness, than any mere eulogium could
inspire."
Walter George Smith.
Philadelphia.

